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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT
LIMITATIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION-LITIGATION AS A PROTECTED
FORM OF EXPRESSION
LITIGATION to enforce civil rights, carried on in an environment
where other meaningful opportunities for political expression have
been curtailed, has been held to be a form of expression protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments in a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court. In NAACP v. Button,1 the Court
held unconstitutional a Virginia anti-solicitation statute which was
construed by a state court to prohibit the NAACP from advising
prospective school segregation litigants to seek the assistance of any
particular attorney.
In 1956, the Virginia legislature adopted a series of provisions
designed to augment its statutory regulation of the practice of law.
Included therein was chapter 33,2 which made unlawful the solicita-
tion of legal business for an attorney or for an organization which
retains an attorney in connection with an action to which the organi-
zation is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or
liability. The statute imposed criminal penalties on both the lawyer
who accepted and the agent who solicited such legal business. 3 The
NAACP, fearful of possible prosecution as an agent engaged in
unlawful solicitation, sought a judgment declaring the statute in-
applicable to it or, alternatively, unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment.4  Affirming a lower court decision, the Virginia
1 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2 VA. CoDE ANN. § 54-79 (1958), which codifies chapter 33, provides that "It shall
be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or association to act as a runner
or capper... to solicit any business for an attorney at law or such person, partnership,
corporation, organization or association ['which employs, retains, or compensates any
attorney at law in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such person,
partnership, corporation, organization or association is not a party and in which it
has no pecuniary right or liability' (§ 54-78)] .... "
0 The statute provides for a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not less than one nor more than six months,
or both. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-82 (1958). An additional provision allows the Virginia
Attorney-General, or any party threatened with injury, to seek injunctive relief against
solicitation. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-83.1 (1958).
'The instant case, involving chapter 33, has a long and rather complicated history,
owing to the fact that it grew out of a broad attempt by the NAACP to test the
constitutionality of other sections of the Virginia Code pertaining to the solicitation of
legal business. The case had its origin in a federal district court where the NAACP
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Supreme Court of Appeals held that certain activities of the NAACP
fell within the statutory prohibitions and that the state could consti-
tutionally curtail such activities. 5 In upholding the constitutionality
of the statute, the Virginia high court indicated that the statute did
not prevent the NAACP from informing persons of their legal rights,
advising them to assert such rights through litigation, or even con-
tributing funds to individuals to aid them in financing suits. As
construed by the court, the statute prohibited only NAACP solicita-
tion of clients for particular attorneys. However, the Virginia court
failed to establish clearly whether the statute prohibited the NAACP
only from referring litigants to attorneys connected in some manner
with the Association or whether, more generally, it imposed a blanket
prohibition against referral to any specific attorney.6
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
a fair reading of the statute, as construed by the state court, seemed to
prohibit the NAACP from referring litigants, not only to its own
attorneys or attorneys associated with it, but to any particular
attorney whatever. In that context, the Court held that the statute
violated the petitioner's constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Brennan,
delivering the opinion of the Court,1 emphasized that the litigation
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., sought to enjoin enforcement
of chapters 31, 32, 33, 35, and 36 of the 1956 session laws of Virginia. In NAACP v.
Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), the court held unconstitutional chapters 31
and 32, requiring the NAACP and the Defense Fund to register with the state, and
chapter 35, defining the crime of barratry. The court refused to pass on the consti-
tutionality of chapters 33 or 36, the latter prohibiting advocacy of suits against the
state, until they had been construed by a state court. On appeal, sub nom. Harrison
v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the federal court could not pass upon the constitutionality of any of the statutes
until they had been construed by a state court. The NAACP and the Defense Fund
then sought a declaratory judgment from the state courts. A Virginia lower court in-
validated all but chapters 33 and 36. In NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d
55 (1960), the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared chapter 36 unconstitutional,
but upheld chapter 33 as constitutional. The Supreme Court then granted the instant
petition for certiorari. NAACP v. Harrison, 365 U.S. 842 (1961).
'NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960), rev'd sub nom. NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
' "[T]he appellants, or those associated with them, shall not solicit legal business
for their attorneys or any particular attorneys .... " Id. at 165, 116 S.E.2d at 72.
" 371 U.S. at 417. Justices Douglas and White wrote separate opinions. Mr. Justice
Douglas, while concurring in the decision of the Court, submitted that the Virginia
statute was also invalid under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as a discriminatory state law enacted specifically for the purpose of curtailing
NAACP activities. Id. at 445. Mr. Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, expressed concern that the tenor of the opinion of the Court indicated
potential hostility to a hypothetical statute, more narrowly drawn to proscribe only
NAACP interference with the actual control and direction of litigation. Id. at 447.
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of civil rights is a form of expression protected from undue state
infringement by the first amendment. While the rights guaranteed
by the first amendment are not absolute, the Court determined
that the state had failed to show the type of legitimate interest that
would justify proscribing such guarantees, especially where, as here,
litigation might well be the only effective avenue for expression
available to a minority. Of special concern to the Court was the
breadth and vagueness of the language employed in the statute,
which, it concluded, made it hazardous for an attorney or the
NAACP to attempt even the sort of preliminary advice and support
that the Virginia court's interpretation of the statute purported to
allow.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, dis-
sented" on the ground that a fair reading of the statute as interpreted
by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals prohibited only NAACP
referral of litigants to attorneys associated in some way with the
NAACP. The dissenters concluded that the state had demonstrated
such a valid regulatory interest as would justify the limited intrusion
on petitioner's first amendment rights resultant from such an enact-
ment.
State regulation of the legal profession, either through court-
adopted rules or legislative enactment, traditionally has been re-
garded as within the valid exercise of state power." Sound policy
reasons, posited on the need for competence and high ethical stand-
ards in a profession which so greatly affects the public interest,
sustain the need for such regulations.10 One of the most prevalent
of the regulations adopted by the states is that against the solicitation
of legal business, either by the lawyer himself or by an agent. Anti-
solicitation regulations have been rationalized on various grounds,
primarily on the theory that the use of judicial machinery should
be reserved exclusively for the use of those who feel sufficiently
damaged to institute litigation on their own volition."
8 Id. at 448.
0 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (establishment of integrated bar in
state); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) (state regulation of professional conduct
of lawyers); Symposium-The Practice of Lawu, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 387 (1959).
10 See generally Symposium-The Practice of Law, supra note 9.
12 See 3 RAcE REL. L. RaP. 1257, 1263 (1958); Comment, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 674,
676 (1958). The commentator in the latter work concludes, however, that "if indi-
vidual rights be emphasized and the theory be adopted that the function of the courts
is to enforce all valid claims, then stirring up litigation must be considered a desirable
activity." Id. at 676-77.
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The modem rules against solicitation have grown out of the
common law doctrines of barratry, champerty and maintenance,
which made such solicitation criminal conduct.12  The historical
development of the common law crimes indicates that they were
directed primarily toward curbing the malicious incitement of litiga-
tion and the practice of stirring up litigation with the prospect of
deriving private gain from another's legal action.13
While states are free to exercise considerable discretion in regu-
lating the legal profession, including the practices of solicitation,
such regulation is not without constitutional restrictions. The
Supreme Court, for example, has held that the states' power to
regulate the legal profession is subject to procedural due process
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 14  Moreover, a long line
12 "Barratry is the crime or offense of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels
between individuals, either at law or otherwise." 9 C.J.S. Barratry § 1 (1938).
"Champerty consists of an agreement whereby a person without interest in
another's suit undertakes to carry it on at his own expense, in whole or in part, in
consideration of receiving, in the event of success, a part of the proceeds of the litiga-
tion.
"Maintenance exists when a person without interest in a suit officiously inter-
-meddles therein by assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or
defend it." 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1939).
13 The common law doctrines had their formative development in the medieval
period as a means of preventing corruption of the judicial machinery and the op-
pression of commoners by feudal lords. See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24
CALIF. L. Rv. 48 (1935). The early law developed with a strictness which prohibited
any assistance at all, monetary or otherwise, by a persoi with no interest in an action.
The doctrine at one time reached a point where it prohibited volunteering evidence
without first being subpoenaed for such a purpose. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 448,
449 (1957); Master v. Miller, 4 Term R. 320, 340, 100 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1053 (K.B.
1791). With the passing of the feudal system and the conditions which gave rise to
the strict application of the early doctrines, the older harshness of the doctrines
was relaxed to a considerable extent. One manifestation of this relaxation was the
exceptions which permitted the giving of assistance where there was a family relation-
ship or where the aid was given to an indigent person. See, e.g., Wallach v. Rabinowitz,
185 Wis. 115, 200 NAV. 646 (1924). The main development since the demise of the
feudal period has been to relax the strict severity of the doctrines, but to preserve them
through codification for use where the evils for which they were intended as remedies
make themselves apparent. "Modern authority ... has introduced the idea that main-
tenance is not committed unless something is done which tends to obstruct the course
of justice, or is against good public policy in tending to promote unnecessary litigation,
and is performed under a bad motive." 10 Am. JUR. Champerty and Maintenance
§ 1 (1937). Thus modern anti-solicitation statutes emphasize the general feeling that
solicitation is likely to have a detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship, on
the public in general, and on the profession. Undue emphasis on pecuniary gain,
the possibility of stirring up fraudulent claims, and, where a lay intermediary is used
for purposes of solicitation, the possible conflict between loyalty to client and loyalty
to intermediary, are considered the main problems to be guarded against. See gen-
erally Note, 7 VAND. L. Rav. 677 (1954).
24 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
[Vol. 1963: 545
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
of cases has gradually absorbed into the due process clause of the
fourteenth the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment, in-
cluding those of expression, association and petition involved in the
Button case. 15 Thus there is presented the potential for conflict
between a state attempt to prohibit solicitation under its substantive
power to regulate the legal profession and the protected rights of
political expression and association, where the exercise of such
rights takes the form of litigation. This potential for conflict was
increased by Brown v. Board of Education' in 1954, a decision
which provided the legal stimulus for increased NAACP activity in
the field of assisting individuals in the institution of suits to combat
racial discrimination. In response to this activity, seven Southern
states, including Virginia, enacted statutes redefining and broadening
In Schware petitioner had been denied permission to take the state bar examina-
tion on the ground that he did not have the good moral character required by statute
of applicants seeking to take the examination. The State Board of Bar Examiners
based its conclusion on petitioner's own admission that he had twice been arrested,
though not convicted, for criminal syndicalism and violating the Neutrality Act of
1940, and on the fact that petitioner had been a member of the Communist Party for
eight years, some fifteen years prior to his petition for permission to take the state bar
examination. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was
no evidence which rationally justified a finding that petitioner was morally unqualified
to take the examination and that disqualification violated petitioner's right to due
process under the fourteenth amendment.
Konigsberg involved a candidate for admission to the bar who had been denied
membership because he had failed to prove that he was of good moral character and
that he did not advocate overthrow of the government by force and violence. Peti-
tioner refused to answer questions asked of him in regard to his political views or
associations, except to state that he did not advocate the overthrow of the government
by force. Denial of admission to the bar was based on evidence that petitioner had
attended Communist Party meetings many years before and on editorials he had
written criticizing the Supreme Court and other public bodies. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented did not warrant
denial of admission to the bar for the reasons advanced by the state, and. therefore,
such denial violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
15The first indication of such incorporation of first amendment rights into the due
process clause of the fourteenth was in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925):
"For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among
the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
The first actual use of the first amendment to protect freedom of speech from state
intrusion was in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Thereafter followed the full
incorporation of the first into the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(freedom of assembly); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of
religion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (freedom to petition for redress of grievances).
1- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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solicitation offenses. ; Though stated in general terms, the statutes
were obviously enacted to exact penalties against organizations such
as the NAACP and attorneys cooperating with them.18
First amendment cases present the Supreme Court with certain
profound and difficult constitutional questions. The difficulty stems
from a growing awareness that the guarantees embodied in the first
amendment are fundamental to a democratic society,10 and even,
perhaps, that these rights enjoy a preferred position therein.20  In
Button, this primacy of first amendment rights resulted in the
Court's rejection of the presumption of constitutionality usually
afforded legislation not affecting these freedoms.21  On the other
hand, the Court has demonstrated a belief that the exercise of re-
served powers by the states is necessary to good social order and must
be validated even where there is a danger of some infringement of
first amendment rights. In situations where conflict arises between
17 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-703 to -712 (Supp. 1961); FLA,. STAT. §§ 877.01-.02 (1961);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-4701, -4703 (Supp. 1961); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2049-01 to -08 (1956);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-521 to -525 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp.
1962); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, -78, -79 (1958).
188 RAGE REL REP. 1257 (1958).
9 "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the fourteenth] ... Amend-
ment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, supra note 15, at s03 (1940).
"[TJhis Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights
guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on
the States. Explicitly recognized to be of this 'fundamental nature' and therefore
immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First
Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for
redress of grievances." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (dictum).
20 The possibility that the freedoms embodied in the first amendment may stand
on a higher plane than other substantive provisions in the Constitution was first
indicated by Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 804 U.S. 144,
152-53 nA (1938): "It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation . . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial
minorities . . . whether prejudice against ...minorities may be a special condition
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." Several cases quite clearly indicate a preferred position
approach: Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court in the instant
case referred to the rights protected by the first amendment as "our most precious
freedoms." 371 U.S. at 438. But see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), indicating that
the Supreme Court never did or, at least, no longer does adhere to a preferred position
view.
"1 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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state regulations and first amendment freedoms, the Court's usual,
though not exclusive, approach is to attempt to balance the com-
peting public and individual interests. 22  Thus, despite very definite
first amendment ramifications, the Court has made it clear that the
states may properly police their streets and keep them open to
traffic, 23 prevent fraud on the part of solicitors for charity by re-
quiring them to identify themselves, 24 and forbid a parent to allow
a child to distribute literature.25 Where the question of state regu-
lation of admission to the practice of law is involved, the Court has
upheld state denial of admission to the bar because of an applicant's
refusal to answer questions concerning certain associational activities,
where the questions were deemed essential to an inquiry into the
fitness of a candidate for the bar. While recog-nizing that the first
amendment encompasses the right of association and the right to
remain silent, the Court nevertheless has permitted state bar boards
to disqualify applicants on the ground that failure to cooperate made
it impossible for the bar examiners to determine the applicants'
fitness for the practice of law.26
Though it is arguable that the Court in Button did not resort
to a balancing test at all in invalidating the legislation in question,27
balancing would seem an inevitable concomitant of the Court's re-
22 See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 U.S. 72 (1959). Mr. Justice Black has for many years
been the leading opponent of the balancing test as applied to first amendment cases.
See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 86, 57 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
21 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
21 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 15.
25 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
21In re Anastaplo, 366 US. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
- The problem of determining whether the Court in the instant case did balance
or not arises because of considerable confusion as to the precise meaning of that term
and its applicability to a particular set of facts. The balancing test, as originally
espoused in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), was to be applied where a general
regulatory statute, having its principle effect on conduct, also had the incidental effect
of depriving individuals or groups of a means of communicating with the public. In
such a case, the approach would be to weigh the interests of the state in regulating
such conduct against the magnitude of the effect that the regulation has on proscribing
first amendment rights. Under such a view of the balancing test, it could be argued
that balancing was inapplicable in Button, because the statute involved therein, while
superficially directed at the regulation of conduct, was primarily directed at curtailing
a means of communication. The difficulty with such a conclusion, however, is that
more recent developments in the balancing doctrine indicate that the Court is willing
to validate even those statutes aimed primarily at the regulation of speech, if the
public interest to be served thereby outweighs the detrimental effect on first amend-
ment liberties. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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luctance to interfere with state regulation of the legal profession.
The Court has shown a marked proclivity toward careful examina-
tion of the record in determining where the balance shall be struck
in a particular case.23 Thus in Button, careful scrutiny was given
to the historical development of the type of statute being reviewed,
and it appears the Court's decision was determined to a marked
degree by its conclusion that the record in the instant case failed to
manifest the presence of the type of evils traditionally remedied
by anti-solicitation statutes. The Court's approach in this respect
was not dissimilar to that in the case of NAA CP v. A labama,29 where
it invalidated a state's use of a technical statute designed for con-
trolling business enterprises, where applied to limit the activities
of the Association in seeking to advance minority interests.
The Court also displayed notable concern and sensitivity as to
the necessary effect of the Virginia enactment. There was no hesi-
tation in recognizing that the modification of anti-solicitation statutes
in Virginia and several other Southern states"0 followed closely on
the heels of the provocative Brown decision, which gave fresh im-
petus to the institution of civil rights litigation. Significantly, cog-
nizance was taken of the fact that the statute would be applied in
a situation where the minority group's opportunity for effective po-
litical expression and petition for redress of grievances of other
means already had been effectively stymied. The likely result from
such a composite of facts weighed heavily on the Court: If the
NAACP were not allowed to provide the impetus in instituting
28 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). "Many times in the past this
Court has said that despite findings below, we will examine the evidence for ourselves
to ascertain whether federally protected rights have been denied . . . Even a partial
abandonment of this rule makes a dark day for civil liberties in our nation." Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
29 357 U.S. 449 (1958). This case arose when the state attempted to enjoin the
NAACP from conducting further activities within the state. It was contended that
the NAACP was not entitled to do business in the state because of failure to comply
with a statutory requirement that foreign corporations file their corporate charters
with the Secretary of State and designate a place of business and agent to receive
process. A state court then restained the NAACP from further activity, and required
the Association to produce the names and addresses of all its members and agents
within the state. The NAACP was willing to disclose the names of its officers and
employees in the state, but refused to disclose the names of ordinary members, con-
tending that such refusal was privileged under the first and fourteenth amendments.
On certiorari, the Court held that required disclosure of rank-and-file members violated
constitutional guarantees of speech and association and that the state had demon-
strated no interest sufficient to justify the deterrent effect disclosure would have on
association.
30See note 17 supra.
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claims for redress in this area of the law, such claims would quite
likely never be made at all, particularly in view of the reluctance
white Southern lawyers have demonstrated in accepting such cases.3'
In view of the emphasis placed on the record in first amendment
cases,3 2 the significance of the Button decision must be assessed
primarily in light of the detailed facts of the case. At a minimum,
therefore, it may be said that Button stands for the proposition that
broadly construed statutes, applied in a context where litigation is
a manifestation of political expression, will be invalidated where
the dangers that the statutes were designed to combat have not been
substantiated. It may well be that a more carefully drawn statute,
proscribing only NAACP referral of litigants to NAACP associated
lawyers, and not to any particular lawyer, would not be governed by
the instant case. A showing that the NAACP actually interfered
in the details of litigation after referral was made, or that there were
real dangers of divided loyalty on the part of the lawyer, might result
in an outcome quite different from that in the instant case.33
If Button stands on a broader basis, however, then the Court's
position in recent cases, 34 upholding state denial of admission to the
bar where the petitioners alleged violations of free speech by such
denial, may warrant critical review. The cases involved candidates
for admission to the bar who refused to answer questions pertaining
to their past or present membership in the Communist Party, con-
tending that such refusal was privileged under the first amendment.
The Court held that the states' interest in requiring a full showing
as to the fitness and qualifications of those seeking admission to the
bar warranted the states' refusal to grant admission to a candidate
81371 U.S. at 443.
2 See note 28 supra.
:3But see 371 U.S. at 447 (White, J., dissenting in part).
'In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
After the Supreme Court's decision in the first Konigsberg case, supra note 14, the
state bar examiners held further hearings on petitioner's qualifications for admission
to the bar, during the course of which the petitioner was asked again about Communist
Party membership. He refused to answer on the ground that the questions violated
his first amendment rights of thought and expression. Petitioner was then denied
admission on the ground that his refusal to answer had obstructed the efforts to
ascertain his qualifications. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the state's decision to deny admission, concluding that a state has a legitimate interest
in requiring candor from applicants for admission to the bar, and if lack of candor
obstructs a full investigation into a candidate's qualifications, then the state may
rightfully deny admission. Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra. A similar conclusion on facts
substantially the same was reached in In re Anastaplo. supra.
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whose refusal to disclose certain associational activities amounted
to obstruction of a proper state function.
If the broad basis on which the Button decision rests is a
willingness of the Court to examine closely a state's exercise of regu-
latory powers over the legal profession and determine for itself on
the basis of the record whether the fundamental purpose of the
regulation is to work a deprivation of constitutionally protected
rights, then it would seem that the decisions in the bar admission
cases are lamentably inconsistent with the outcome in Button. As
Mr. Justice Black indicated 5 when he registered his dissents in the
bar admission cases, the Court refused to look beyond the reasons
given by the bar examiners to justify rejection of petitioners for ad-
mission to the bar, despite a strong indication in the record that
refusal was based primarily on conjecture as to the past or present
political suasion of the petitioners in those cases. The difference in
approach of the Court in Button may indicate that the Court in the
future will feel less constrained to accept at face value a state's
assertion of a regulatory interest over the legal profession where
there are involved possible infringements of first amendment
guarantees.
11 "[T]his record shows, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the reason Konigsberg
has been rejected is because the Committee suspects that he was at one time a
member of the Communist Party.
"The majority avoids the otherwise unavoidable necessity of reversing the judgment
below on that ground by simply refusing to look beyond the reason given by the [bar
examiners] to justify Konigsberg's rejection." Konigsberg v. State Bar. supra note 34,
at 59-60 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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